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Executive summary 
Research on cultural change has produced mixed results. Some studies celebrate the capacity of 
charismatic and visionary leaders to carry out rapid transformations in organizational norms and 
values. Other studies warn us that these changes may be short-lived: organizations tend to 
resist cultural change, and when coercive pressure from the top is relaxed, they often revert to 
traditional patterns of behavior. 
Our longitudinal study of the implementation of Six Sigma at 3M suggests that 
organizational cultures may be simultaneously more and less receptive to long-lasting changes 
that currently believed. When asked to behave in ways that conflict with the usual “way we do 
things around here” employees may accept to revise their beliefs and habits if they experience 
changes as offering superior solutions to their problems. They will do so, however, only to the 
extent that changes are not perceived as threatening deeply-held, emotionally-laden “core” 
values, that they perceive as foundational, enduring and distinctive for the organization. 
Our observations suggest a multi-layered conceptualization of organizational culture 
according to their relative malleability of its elements. They remind organizational leaders about 
the importance of assessing whether the changes that they envision will simply enrich the 
cultural repertoire of the organization or will require modifications in the widely-accepted, but 
not deeply-held beliefs and norms of behavior, or may challenge the core values that define the 
very identity of the organization and its members.  
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Organizational and strategic changes often require employees to modify their behavior 
in ways that conflict with traditional “ways of doing things around here” – or, in other words, 
with the culture of the organization. Edgar Schein describes organizational culture as a set of 
assumptions and beliefs that shape how people habitually relate to one another, their tasks, 
and the broader environment. These assumptions are mostly tacit and taken for granted. They 
usually manifest more consciously-held values, defining desirable or undesirable behavior 
deserving punishment or reward. These values are often formalized in organizational 
statements, but, together with the underlying assumptions, also manifest a web of visible and 
tangible expressions, through corporate jargon, symbols, stories, practices, myths, physical 
settings and others, collectively referred to as organizational artifacts.  
Schein’s framework is useful to describe an organizational culture at a given point of 
time. It draws attention to how the various elements of a culture are tied together in a relatively 
coherent whole and, also because of this coherence, how difficult to change culture is. People, 
according to this view, are reluctant to modify traditional habits. Altering more superficial 
practices, structures and systems may conflict with the deeper assumptions they embody and 
symbolize. Changing the way people relate to one another, or perform their tasks may generate 
uncomfortable dissonance with what they have always believed to be the appropriate way, 
reflecting these fundamental assumptions. Because of their taken-for-granted nature, however, 
these assumptions are not usually open to debate. 
How is it possible, then, for senior managers to promote and manage cultural changes? 
While there is general agreement that cultures tend to change naturally and incrementally 
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because of demographic changes and changes in the broader cultural environment, scholars are 
divided about whether profound cultural changes can be introduced quickly and purposefully. 
Some authors celebrate the capacity of charismatic and visionary leaders to carry out rapid 
transformations in organizational norms and values, and to induce radical changes in people’s 
behavior. Successful cultural change depends on the capacity of organizational leaders to create 
a sense of urgency, articulate an alternative vision for the future, and encourage changes 
through a combination of substantial and symbolic moves that signal the rest of the 
organization that it has to revise its values and priorities.  
Other authors – taking a longer-term perspectives – warn us that the short-term changes 
that we observe in these cases may be only ceremonial or ephemeral. Organizational culture – 
Daniel Denison reminds us – is “what people do when none is looking”: people may temporarily 
comply with the new norms, but when coercion is relaxed, they often revert to traditional 
patterns of behavior reflecting deeply-ingrained assumptions. At times, extraordinary 
organizational circumstances, such as spin-offs and demergers, or severe organizational crises, 
may induce people to be more receptive to cultural changes, as traditional assumptions no 
longer apply or seem to ensure the survival of the organization. Under normal circumstances, 
however, changing organizational cultures is one of the most serious challenges for 
organizational leaders. 
Our longitudinal study of the implementation of Six Sigma at 3M, under the leadership of 
CEO James McNerney, first, and George Buckley, later, indicates that, to some extent, both 
these perspectives are right and both are wrong. Our findings suggest that inducing long-lasting 
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changes in people’s assumptions about the appropriate ways of addressing their tasks and 
relating to each other is possible – and perhaps less difficult than currently assumed. Coercive 
implementation of new practices, structures, and systems may force people to experiment with 
new ways of doing things that may, over time, become assimilated as “the appropriate way” to 
the extent that they are perceived as providing better solutions to day-to-day problems or 
improving organizational performance. However, these changes will only last to extent that they 
are perceived as compatible with a restricted set of “core” values that define the identity of the 
organization in the eyes of its members (and, to some extent, its stakeholders too). 
Organizational cultures, in other words, are amenable to change, but it is these core values – 
the organizational identity – that set the acceptable boundaries of the change. 
IMPLEMENTING SIX SIGMA AT 3M 
Founded in 1902, 3M is one of the few U.S.-based multinational corporations that is more 
than a hundred years old. After a somewhat difficult start, it established itself in the 
manufacturing of a large number of products related to adhesives and coatings. Since then, it 
has experienced continuous growth, expanding its offering into several markets. 3M now 
operates in a wide range of industries and markets, where it pursues a differentiation strategy, 
fueled by an impressive effort and success in technological innovation. For many decades 3M 
has consistently spent twice as much as the average US company in R&D, and significantly more 
than its competitors. 
3M is also widely known for its distinctive organizational culture, which encourages self-
initiative, autonomy, and collaboration among colleagues. William McKnight, president in 1929, 
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and then chairman of the board between 1949 and 1966, is largely credited for instilling these 
values in the company. His managerial principles – internally known as the “McKnight’s 
Principles” – were first laid out in 1948, and were still present in the corporate website at the 
time of our study: 
"As our business grows, it becomes increasingly necessary to delegate responsibility and to 
encourage men and women to exercise their initiative. This requires considerable 
tolerance. Those men and women, to whom we delegate authority and responsibility, if 
they are good people, are going to want to do their jobs in their own way. 
 
Mistakes will be made. But if a person is essentially right, the mistakes he or she makes are 
not as serious in the long run as the mistakes management will make if it undertakes to tell 
those in authority exactly how they must do their jobs. 
 
Management that is destructively critical when mistakes are made kills initiative. And it's 
essential that we have many people with initiative if we are to continue to grow." 
These principles, the enduring legacy of a legendary leader of the past, articulate some of the 
assumptions underlying what people at 3M considered their most important and distinctive 
values: self-initiative, creativity, collaboration, and tolerance for mistakes.  
The values of self-initiative and tolerance for mistakes were clearly expressed in the widely 
repeated motto “Better ask for forgiveness than for permission.” Self initiative was also 
encouraged by the ample autonomy the research labs enjoyed. Micro-management was 
shunned, and the organization was designed to “get out of people’s way.” “You do not build 
fences around people” – McKnight used to say – “fences make sheep”. Self initiative was also 
encouraged by the celebrated 20% rule, according to which scientists and engineers were 
allowed to spend 20% of their time in skunkwork projects that would occasionally lead to 
commercial blockbusters, such as the popular Post-it. A corporate biography issued soon after 
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McNerney’s arrival claimed how “attracting and retaining imaginative and productive people” 
and “designing an organization that does not get in people’s way” were “key ingredients that 
foster a culture of innovation at 3M.”  
Self-initiative and tolerance for mistakes were considered essential to stimulate creativity and 
innovation. 3M’s Time Tested Truth included “Give good people opportunities, support them 
and watch them thrive”, and “Innovation comes from individuals, not just following orders”. 
Employees were encouraged to follow their judgment and gut feelings, and occasional failures 
were tolerated as “part of the game” – the inevitable side effect of constantly trying to push the 
technological frontier. People should not fear for their jobs because the ideas they had pursued 
failed, or they would not have the confidence to take the bold risks associated with radical 
innovation.  
Collaboration across labs, divisions, and country organizations was also considered essential 
for the exchange of knowledge, ideas and experiences, and for the transfer and replication of 
innovation across units. A strong collegial spirit and an egalitarian culture fostered 
collaboration, and building positive interpersonal relationships was important for advancing in 
the organization.  
These values supported a business model based on the constant exploration of new 
technological opportunities that opened up new markets and market segments where 3M could 
reap high margins to cover the high investments in research and development. Based on this 
model, 3M had thrived for more than 90 years. In the early 1990s, however, the traditional 
double-digit growth of the company had begun to slow down, and in 1995, for the first time in 
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its history, 3M failed to meet its goals, reporting an 8% rather than the predicted 10% growth in 
earnings per share. In 2000, the increasing dissatisfaction of business analysts and investors 
with the low profitability of 3M, if compared with other high-tech companies, led to a lagging 
stock price in the face of a rising market, and induced the board of directors, for the first time in 
the company’s history, to appoint an outsider as CEO: former General Electric VP James 
McNerney.  
After a few weeks, the new CEO announced a vast program of organizational changes. 
Central to these changes was the companywide implementation of Six Sigma™, a set of quality-
control techniques morphed into managerial practices to stimulate efficiency and productivity, 
which he had mastered at GE under the leadership of Jack Welch. Central to Six Sigma is the 
structuring of any management problem in quantitative terms by identifying relevant variables 
(the “Ys” and “Xs”). It mandates the use of specific graphs, tables and documents to identify 
optimal solutions, by minimizing risk, uncertainty, and waste of resources. The implementation 
of these solutions is closely monitored, and successful solutions are replicated throughout the 
organization.  
The new practice embodied assumptions and values that seemed to collide with 3M’s 
traditional culture, and raised initial concerns about their compatibility. The new CEO dismissed 
these fears, stating that he valued 3M’s tradition of innovation immensely, and that he would 
consider himself as having failed if his ideas affected 3M’s innovative traits. Yet, it was clear to 
everyone that Six Sigma was a way for the new CEO to induce long-lasting cultural changes in 
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the organization – an intent that McNerney had signaled unequivocally soon after his arrival, by 
stating “I am here to change your DNA!”  
McNerney’s swift, forceful action and his personal charisma helped him rally the organization 
and push it to take on the challenge. Early results – lower inventory levels, higher cash flows, 
profitability, and stock price – energized the organization and reinforced confidence in the new 
practice. In the following years, however, the initial enthusiasm gradually gave way to increasing 
disillusionment and, when, in 2005 McNerney suddenly left the organization to become CEO of 
Boeing, the elaborate Six Sigma structures and practices were largely dismantled. When asked 
whether McNerney and Six Sigma had eventually changed the culture of the organization in the 
long run, the answer of our informants was simultaneously “yes” and “no”.  
Using Six Sigma to promote cultural changes  
A few weeks after his appointment, McNerney summoned all 3M’s executives from around 
the world for a three-day seminar on Six Sigma. He announced that all regular employees, with 
more than two years of working experience would receive a basic training on the Six Sigma 
methodology (“green belt” training). Training was delivered locally, but it was mandatory for 
local trainers to use centrally developed corporate material. After this initial training, green 
belts were expected to complete 0.5 Six Sigma projects every year. This goal became part of 
their annual appraisal.  
A number of selected employees would become “black belts”: internal experts, whose task 
was to advise others on Six Sigma practices and monitor the use of these practices throughout 
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the organization. Black belts were chosen from young high-potentials across the company. They 
were enrolled in a two-year training program carried out at the headquarters, and became 
responsible for building the ranks of the “Six Sigma structure”, a newly created staff division, 
whose leader responded directly to the CEO. At the end of the program, black belts would be 
appointed to more senior positions, at times involving a jump of two levels on 3M’s promotion 
scale. 
Standard Six Sigma DMAIC and DFSS methodology was implemented globally across all units 
and divisions, from manufacturing to sales, marketing, and the research labs. DMAIC (an 
acronym for Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control) is a method aimed at improving 
existing business processes. DFSS (an acronym for Design For Six Sigma) aims at reducing 
uncertainty and inefficiency in new product or process designs. Training started in the summer 
of 2001, and by the end of 2004, all salaried employees (around 80,000 people) had been 
trained in Six Sigma. By the first  quarter of 2004, more than 11,000 projects had been 
completed throughout the organization, and another 12,000 were under way. 
The faithful implementation of Six Sigma techniques required 3Mers to address their tasks 
and relate to one another in ways that differ considerably from what they were use to. The new 
practices reflected assumptions – about the goals of organizations, the nature of people and 
social relationships, the nature of uncertainty and the basis of good decisions – that clashed 
with the fundamental assumptions that the old 3M culture rested upon (see Table 1). “We are a 
technological company” – one of our informants said – “We were used to hear our leaders talk 
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about technologies, innovation, growth, research and development, not about finance and cash 
flow.”  
Six Sigma had its roots in quality improvement and waste reduction. It aimed at increasing 
efficiency and productivity through an optimal use of resources.  It invited people to make 
decisions based on accurate quantitative assessment – “Say yes with data” was the new motto – 
and to focus efforts on incremental, market-driven innovation. While risk had always been 
considered inherent in research and development, Six Sigma tried to minimize uncertainty and 
errors. People were expected to set themselves challenging goals (a “Goal Tree”), and were 
closely monitored on their attainment. Success and failure had immediate consequences for 
careers and rewards. “Before we had a culture of ‘Let’s try, and if does not work, we’ll find a 
justification for it’.” – said another informant – “Now this is not acceptable. Before acting, you 
have to give yourself a goal, and a supra-goal called ‘entitlement’, and you have to make sure to 
achieve at least your goal”. 
Some people in the organizations were alarmed that the new “data culture” – with its 
emphasis on risk-reduction, efficiency, and accountability – would undermine 3M’s traditional 
innovative ability. They feared that Six Sigma would reduce the possibility for scientists to 
stumble on new innovative solutions. Others, however, welcomed the increased rigor that the 
Six Sigma had introduced in decision making and evaluation, the stricter monitoring and control 
over the use of resources associated with it, and the increased rewards for high performers. The 
forceful implementation of the new practices, however, left no choice but to adopt them – and 
most people around the organization did it, and did it earnestly. 
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Despite initial concerns, early financial results seemed to indicate that changes had produced 
substantial benefits. In the first three years, Six Sigma projects were claimed to have produced 
savings for about $400 million/year. These figures even exceed the CEO’s expectations and 
initial forecasts. In the meantime, 3M’s share price on the NYSE almost doubled between 2001 
and 2004.  
Six Sigma as a new religion 
The apparent success of the “new way of doing things” reinforced the influence of the Black 
belt division, and encouraged the enforcement of tighter controls on the companywide 
initiation and execution of Six Sigma projects. The marginal improvements of additional 
projects, however, started to decline. People complained about the increasing amount of time 
and resources dedicated to Six Sigma projects that  subtracted to business development. They 
began to lament that Six Sigma had become a new “fashion” or a “religion” to be followed, 
regardless of its practical benefits. Six Sigma metrics seemed to have become more important 
than business results. Conformity to Six Sigma rules seemed to be slowly displacing the overall 
efficiency goals that the new practice was initially intended to enhance. More importantly, as 
the new practice fully displayed its effects, it appeared that increased efficiency had been 
achieved at the expense of growth and innovation, as reflected in the declining percentage of 
revenues from new products. 
While at an early stage, people had willingly engaged in the “new ways of doing things” 
associated with Six Sigma, despite they clashed with their traditional assumptions, they now 
began to express their discomfort that these changes were threatening what they perceived as 
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core, foundational, and distinctive values that the company had build its fortunes on in the past. 
Excessive planning, they lamented, was stifling creativity and innovation. With Six Sigma, they 
argued, the Post-it, serendipitously developed from failed glue, would have never seen the light.  
Post-it was considered a symbol of how the company’s success was built on autonomy, 
creativity, perseverance, and tolerance for mistakes. “This is not who we are” – people 
reasoned – “If Six Sigma is bad for Post-it, it is bad for 3M.”  
Emphasis on risk-reduction inherent in Six Sigma contrasted with traditional tolerance for 
mistakes and encouragement for self-initiative, reflected in the widely accepted norm that it 
was “Better to ask for forgiveness than for permission.” “We are a company that has been built 
on mistakes.” – one informant remarked – “We are the company that created Art Fry [the 
inventor of Post-it]. We used to glorify mistakes that years later bring amazing products and 
results without a true plan.” Strict control and accountability discouraged self-initiative. As an 
informant observed, under Six Sigma “people did not want to take risks and ask for forgiveness 
later, because they felt there was not a very forgiving atmosphere.”  
Despite the undeniable improvements that Six Sigma brought to the financial performance of 
the company in the early years, employees realized that strict enforcement of Six Sigma had 
begun to threaten foundational values of creativity, self-initiative and collaboration, resistance 
intensified. The implementation of Six Sigma gradually became ceremonial. Six Sigma tools were 
used because they were required, but people found ways to bypass the rules in order to 
operate according to what they perceived as sensible business logic.  
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McNerney himself seemed to realize that in some areas of the organization the costs of a 
strict implementation of Six Sigma were higher than the benefits, and he warned managers not 
to lose sight of the ultimate purpose of the organization. Skepticism, however, increased, and 
when in June 2005 the CEO suddenly left the company for Boeing, his successors began to relax 
the pressure – project managers were given freedom to tailor data analysis and supporting 
documents to the specificities of the case. Senior managers eventually dismantled the Six Sigma 
division and leadership development structure. The quality function was assigned the task to 
hybridize concepts from Six Sigma and lean production for restricted application to the 
company’s manufacturing operations.  
Six Sigma after McNerney 
If we had concluded our study in 2004, we would have prematurely celebrated the 
successful transformation of the company – as other did in similar cases – and attributed it to 
the charismatic leadership of Jim McNerney and his skillful management of the change process. 
Two years later, we would have drawn attention to the inertial nature of organizational 
cultures, and underlined the difficulties to implement long-lasting changes. By prolonging our 
study until 2008, however, we could see how some of the changes had become embedded in 
the fabric of the organization despite the apparent discrepancy between the values Six Sigma 
embodied and the traditional culture of 3M. This observation helped us produce a more 
nuanced representation of the long-term effects of the forceful implementation of new set of 
practices at 3M.  
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Despite the formal rejection of Six Sigma methodology and its refocused application to 
manufacturing, informants agreed that 3M had “changed more in the last few years than in its 
entire history,” and that the experience had impacted the culture of the organization in a 
significant way. Informants who had initially rejected the introduction of standard templates 
and tools to address business problems, because it conflicted with the traditional autonomy left 
to organizational units and divisions, now praised the common language associated with them. 
It simplified communication and facilitated exchanges across units. By doing so, they reasoned, 
the common language introduced by Six Sigma really reinforced collaboration and knowledge 
sharing, especially between the R&D community and the marketing units. Standardized 
templates and a common business language – they claimed – also facilitated the replication of 
initiatives from one part of the company to others. Their mandatory use, however, was 
rejected, because it conflicted with the freedom to use initiative and pursue new ideas that had 
been celebrated throughout 3M’s history. 
Interestingly, several people that had been initially very critical about the new methodology, 
found themselves – somewhat to their surprise – spontaneously using tools and ideas from Six 
Sigma to address their everyday problems even if they were not required anymore to do so. “Six 
Sigma changed the way people think”, informants reported, as they explained how, while the 
organization was no longer “obsessed with data”, their way to approach business problems had 
partly changed. Intuition and gut feelings were still trusted, but people now paid more attention 
to numbers than they used to. Decision were no longer aimed at minimizing uncertainty and 
variability, but people had become used to calculate risks associated with their decisions. Failure 
returned to be considered an acceptable outcome of innovation, but people now appreciated 
16 
 
the importance of clarifying expected results, and they took planning and control more 
seriously. “Before [Six Sigma], once we had acted, we would not check carefully if the results 
matched what we expected. Now, we may not follow Six Sigma requirements, but at least we 
monitor actions in a more constant way.” Also thanks to the use of quantitative measurement, 
performance evaluation was now objective and more straightforward.  
Despite these undeniable changes, however, people agreed that Six Sigma had not shaken 
the fundamental beliefs in creativity, collaboration, self-initiative, autonomy, and tolerance for 
mistakes that the company was built on. As an informant insightfully put it, McNerney and Six 
Sigma had “changed our culture, but not the values of the company.” 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
We do not claim that the case of the – successful? Failed? – organizational change at 3M 
under James McNerney should be considered a blueprint for management. We believe, 
however, that this case is instructive because it sharpens our understanding of whether and 
how organizational leaders can introduce long-lasting changes in the organizational culture. 
A practice-based approach to cultural change  
The logic behind the changes introduced by the new CEO made much sense. By using his 
personal charisma and coercive power, he had the whole organization exposed to a completely 
new way to approach business problems. This “new way of doing things” was embodied in a 
new set of practices that all employees were required to familiarize themselves with and to 
apply in their day-to-day activities. Cultural change would be facilitated by a company-wide 
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leadership development program that would ensure the swift promotion of talented managers 
who had internalized the new values of efficiency, data-driven decisions, accountability, and 
competition that the new CEO wanted to diffuse.  
The approach McNerney followed can be described as a practice-based approach to 
cultural change. Often, senior managers attempt to introduce long-lasting changes through a 
concerted effort to persuade the rest of organization to modify their behavior. They articulate a 
new vision and/or set of values, and entrust the diffusion of these values to a combination of 
internal communication, collective workshops, coaching, and training. The problem with this 
approach is that people are then expected to change their behavior and implement new values 
because “it is right to do so.” This approach, however, is often destined to clash with the inertial 
forces that push us to naturally persist in established patterns of behavior, in absence of strong 
motivations to change. 
The approach McNerney followed, instead, encouraged people to change their beliefs, 
by forcing them to engage for a prolonged period of time in work practices that reflected new 
assumptions and embodied new values. Extensive coaching and training would help people 
make sense and master new practices. The redesign of control and incentive systems would 
minimize the risk of symbolic, ceremonial compliance. Over time, experiencing the positive 
effects of the new approach would induce employees to overcome their initial prejudices and to 
revise their traditional beliefs and assumptions about the right way to make business decisions, 
allocate resources, and manage people. Repeated engagement in new work practices, then, 
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would induce people to eventually accept these practices – and internalize the associated 
beliefs and assumptions – “because they work” rather than “because we have to”. 
Organizational identity and the boundaries of cultural change 
In the case of 3M, this approach did not entirely work as planned. Despite the deep 
personal involvement of the CEO in the promotion and diffusion of changes and the positive 
results of the early years, the organization eventually rejected the new practices and the values 
associated with them. Yet, three years of coercive implementation of Six Sigma left profound 
traces in the organizational culture. McNerney’s plan might have not turned 3M into another 
GE, but did not fail entirely either. 
These observations suggest that different elements of an organizational culture may be 
more or less malleable to change, in ways that differ from what traditionally assumed. Schein’s 
widely accepted theory of organizational culture distinguishes between consciously-held and 
espoused values defining appropriate patterns of behavior, and less conscious, tacit 
assumptions about how to address fundamental problems of how to survive and grow as an 
organization, and how to regulate social interaction. Fundamental assumptions are generally 
believed to be intrinsically less debatable and more resistant to change than espoused values.  
At 3M, however, people seemed willing to revise some of their assumptions, about, for 
instance, what makes good business decisions, how to approach risk taking, or how to evaluate 
performance. Perhaps, they did not go as far as the new CEO expected them to, but they 
undeniably modified some of their beliefs, and the associated practices. Yet, they drew a line 
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when changes seemed to threaten some distinctive values – not only espoused, but also highly 
celebrated – that they believe represented the “soul”, the “spirit”, the enduring “essence” of 
the company.  
These observations draw attention to what has been called organizational identity – a 
set of deeply-held and emotionally-laden beliefs about core, enduring, and distinctive attributes 
of the organization. It suggests how the identity of the organization may set strong boundaries 
to the extent to which even powerful and charismatic leaders, such as James McNerney in the 
3M case, can really change the culture of an organization. 
A multi-layered view of organizational culture 
Our study suggests a multi-layered re-conceptualization of organizational culture, 
highlighting the degree to which beliefs, values and assumptions are internalized by people and 
shape their everyday practices (see Figure 1). This conceptualization is supported by recent 
developments in cultural sociology and cognitive anthropology. A rising perspective in cultural 
sociology portrays culture as a “toolkit” – a repertoire of concepts, ideas, beliefs, and symbols 
that people flexibly use to interpret their daily experience and address their problems. Cognitive 
anthropologists argue that, under normal circumstances, how people to use their toolkit is 
shaped by cognitive structures that reflect conventional beliefs and expectations. Not all these 
beliefs, however, will be equally strongly-held and deeply-internalized.  
------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------- 
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In part, our behavior follows taken-for-granted, habitual patterns that we have been 
socialized into and we have come to accept as the customary way to behave in a given situation. 
Some beliefs, norms, and expectations, however, are imbued with particular meaning. Their 
violation or alteration is likely to trigger intense and emotional responses because they are 
more closely related to our understanding of who we are as individuals or members of a 
broader group – an organization, a profession, or a nation. Some elements of culture, in other 
words, are more strongly held and emotionally laden because they are directly related to our 
individual or collective identity.  
When applied to organizations, this suggests that some beliefs and assumptions 
associated with “core” organizational  values matter more than others. They have survived the 
test of time, and have been around for decades. They are central to how people inside and 
outside understand and describe the organization (and themselves).  They are celebrated as 
unique and distinguishing the organization from its competitors. These values, then, will be 
more resistant to change than less deeply internalized habitual patterns of thought and action. 
These observations are consistent with our previous research on organizational identity, 
culture, and change. At hearing-aid producer Oticon, soon after the departure of the visionary 
CEO Lars Kolind, the much celebrated “spaghetti organization” – a fluid, project-based 
organization, based on the dismantling of the corporate hierarchy – eventually returned to a 
more traditional structure, with stable groups and hierarchical levels. At Bang & Olufsen, a 
producer of high-end televisions and audio systems, cultural changes aimed at promoting 
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internal integration and market orientation were carried out within the boundaries of a strong 
organizational identity emphasizing design leadership, technological excellence, creativity and 
inventiveness. In this respect, Alberto Alessi, head of the producer of designers’ kitchenware 
that carries its family name, facilitated the cultural changes that transformed the company from 
a traditional metalworking firm to an internationally renowned design powerhouse by 
articulating a new understanding of the organization – as an artistic mediator, a laboratory in 
applied arts, and a “dream factory” – that helped people make sense of the profound changes 
he was introducing in the company.  
 
SUMMARY 
Organizational cultures – our study indicates – may be more malleable in their outer and 
middle layers, yet more resistant and enduring in their core, than traditional theories of 
organizational change suggest. Our re-conceptualization highlights the centrality of 
organizational identity in shaping how members make sense of what they do and why they do 
it. From a managerial perspective, it suggests that introducing long-lasting changes in 
organizational culture is not impossible. The practice-based approach McNerney followed 
illustrates a possible way to accomplish this change. However, more profound changes that 
affect deeply-held values require organizational leaders to address directly people’s beliefs and 
understandings of the identity of their organization. The vision they articulate should help 
people make sense of how the proposed changes will reinforce these understandings, or 
suggest alternative, attractive, energizing conceptualizations that would justify cultural changes. 
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McNerney’s vision for 3M – a leaner, more efficient organization to liberate resources for 
growth through acquisitions – seems to have failed on both accounts. 
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Table 1. A clash of assumptions: 3M vs. Six Sigma 
Assumptions 3M traditional culture  Six Sigma 
About 
organizational goals 
Long-term growth and innovation: Radical 
technological innovation ensures high premium in 
new markets where the organization leverages 
technological leadership. 
Efficiency and productivity: Focused, market-driven 
innovation ensures an optimal use of the resources 
of the organization. 
Organizational 
strategy 
Investments in basic research are expected to 
generate radical technological innovations, allowing 
the organization to exploit profitable niches. 
Investments should be focused and driven by the 
market. Funding should prioritize projects that 
already have clear market potential. 
About human 
nature  
People will perform if given autonomy and trust. People will perform if held strictly accountable.  
About risk and 
uncertainty 
Risks should be accepted as inherent in delegation 
and freedom of initiative. People are encouraged to 
experiment and to take risk in order to stimulate 
radical innovation.  
Uncertainty and variance in the output or processes 
or projects should be minimized for the sake of 
higher productivity.  
About decision 
making 
Good decisions are based on experience and 
judgment. People are allowed to make decisions 
based on their judgment and “gut feelings.”   
Good decisions are based on careful and systematic 
data collection and analysis (“Say yes with data”). 
Approval for new projects requires extensive data 
gathering and careful analysis.  
About human 
relations 
An organization thrives if internal collaboration 
facilitates the exchange of knowledge and ideas. 
Emphasizing differences in performance de-
motivates and undermined collaboration. 
An organization thrives if competition stimulates 
individual efforts and performance. Outstanding 
talents and accomplishments should be singled out 
and rewarded. 
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Figure 1. Organizational culture: A reconceptualization based on degree of internalization and malleability to change 
 
 
Taken-for-granted beliefs and 
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(Shared symbols, language, ideas, etc.) 
Core values 
(Identity) 
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